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Introduction 
AID OR IMPERIALISM? WEST GERMANY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* 
by 
Brigitte Schulz and William Hansen 
Whenever one takes a look at contemporary relations between the so-called 
Third World and an advanced Western industrialized country, the question as to 
the precise nature of the relationship emerges. While a question of this sort 
was much more easily answered in the era of direct colonial control over vast 
non-European regions, there is much debate concerning the symmetry of economic 
and political relationships in the post-independence period. In fact, to a 
considerable number of observers, it is asymmetry which cbaracteri?es the ties 
between Western industrialized and "underdeveloped" countries, based on a long 
historical process of incorporation into the Western capitalist system. 
Political independence, these critics argue, bas merely shifted the relation-
ship from a "colonial" to a "nee-colonial" one, leaving the unevenness basi-
cally intact. 
This paper will look at one Western country which bas often reen accused 
of having very strong "nee-colonial" or "imperialist" interests in the Third 
World - the Federal Republic of Germany. Heavily dependent on the import of 
raw materials and with an industrial base strongly dependent on foreign mar-
kets, the FRG looks to the outside world for more of its internal economic 
well-being than any other advanced capitalist country, with the exception of 
Japan. The paper will focus on relations between Bonn and sub-Saharan Africa 
and will try to locate the forces which generate these official relations, 
arguing that they spring from the interest of West German capital rather than 
from any particular concern about the fate of the peoples of Africa themselves. 
The theoretical context in which the present study is deveJ oped is one 
which sees the activities of the Bonn government vis-ii-vis Afdca as those 
characteristic of an advanced capitalist state seeking to protE>ct its own 
economic interests. As Claus Offe and many others have noted, domestic inter-
ventionism on the part of the state bas become an acknowledged fact by both 
radical and liberal economists. 1 Opinions diverge sharply, however, when 
the causes for intervention at the international level are being explored. 
The radical school sees a close connection between active international 
participation by the state and the needs of what James O'Connor bas called 
"economic imperialism. "2 '.!'he capitalist state is seen as performing several 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Walter Rodney Seminar, 
Boston University African Studies Center, The authors would like to thank the 
Seminar members for their helpful comments. 
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important functions vis-a-vis Third World countries, particularly those con-
sidered very backward and lacking the proper "climate" for capital accumula-
tion: (1) either to create or maintain a "positive investment climate", and 
(2) the creation of infrastructure3, a task which is too costly for private 
enterprise to tackle. 
Since the underdeveloped countries also have to "furnish a safety valve 
for the tendencies to periodical overproduction which are inherent in capital-
ist economy"4, an additional function of the capitalist state is to insure 
the political and thus economic conditions which make the Third World a ready 
market for surplus goods from industrialized countries. Seen as tJ,e primary 
role of the capitalist state, however, is its function to save the system of 
capitalism itself, both within the confines of the nation-state and inter-
nationally, as !Jarry Magdoff and others have pointed out.5 
Safeguarding their own global economic interests was relatively easy for 
ex-colonial powers with established ties to their former colonies. The 
transition from colonialism to "neo-colonialism" was a rather smooth process 
because most of the close ties established during direct colonial rule 
remained basically intact. Although France now no longer expresses its inter-
ests in Africa on the basis of a mythical "mission civilisatrice," she still 
appears to justify her extensive presence by some vague notion of "natural 
right," backed up, of course, by a considerable military showing on the 
African continent. The United Kingdom, likewise, has ties to extensive parts 
of Africa which date back to colonial times and also appear almost as a 
given. Continued economic domination after formal independence was granted is 
thus a "natural" result of the patterns of dependence established during the 
era of colonial rule. Furthermore, the state in both of these countries was 
well-acquainted with the various mechanisms of protection needed J,y its entre-
preneurs overseas. 
Due to its own historical circumstances there was a great deal of ambiva-
lence concerning the nature of West German ties to post-independence Third 
World countries. As Germany had lost its overseas possessions after World War 
I, its official "colonial" function came to an end four decades before the 
other European colonial powers de-colonized. The economic interests and ties 
established during the colonial period continued to exist, however, albeit no 
longer backed by the traditional colonial mechanisms of military force and 
overt political control. Assuring a place for West German economic interests 
in the era of neo-colonialism was thus a great deal more difficult for Bonn 
than it was for Paris and London. It is argued here that since the only tools 
available to the Bonn government toward this end were political and economic 
(with the military option a complete impossibility, again for historical rea-
sons), it used these most aggressively to open up markets and raw material as 
well as to ensure a proper "investment climate" for its international capital. 
Section II of this paper will look at the economic ties which have been 
established between West Germany and sub-Saharan African countries in the few 
short decades since they have become independent from formal colonial rule. 
It will attempt to assess the relative importance of these ties and focus on 
the ways in which the Bonn government bas attempted to i~fluence them to the 
advantage of its own capitalist class. 
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Section III will focus more specifically on the political tools employed 
by the federal government to further its own interests in Africa. As so-
called "development aid" is a major policy instrument of the Bonn government 
in its relations with the Third World, a detailed study of the various 
programs administered by the federal government under this rubric will be 
included. It will be argued that Entwicklungshilfe is one of the FRG's chosen 
weapons to help establish a global freie Marktwirtschaft; i.e., a global capi-
talist system into which the Third World should become fully integrated. To 
accomplish this, the FRG has called repeatedly for slight modifications in the 
present international division of labor without, however, showing any signs of 
being willing to forfeit even an inch of its own preferred position within 
it. It could be argued also, of course, that the Third World already has been 
fully integrated into the capitalist world economy and that efforts on the 
part of the FRG "to integrate" these regions merely means to tie them more 
closely to the interests of West German capital within a framework of inter-
imperialist rivalry. 
The fourth and final section will review briefly relations between Bonn 
and white minority regimes in Africa. It will argue that these relations have 
been dictated largely by economic self-interest which has traditionally been 
tied closely to these settler regimes. Past national liberation struggles 
(those against the Portuguese and the Rhodesians) received no support from the 
West German state and there is little indication that loyalty has as yet 
shifted away from the minority regime in Pretoria in favor of black majority 
rule in South Africa. Bonn's Friedenspolitik categorically denies oppressed 
peoples the right to rise in arms against their oppressors, thus making it 
somewhat limited as a tool for understanding the forces which shaped recent 
history in the Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe and, one suspects, will forge 
new realities in the Republic of South Africa in the days ahead. 
The West German Economy and Africa 
When the Western allies created the Federal Republic in 1948, they made 
little secret of the fact that they wanted their creation to become a showcase 
for capitalism. Leaving existing patterns of ownership and economic power 
basically intact6 and eliminating the German left as a possible challenger 
to this plan, 7 they paved the way for West Germany's Wirtschaftswunder. 
Massive amounts of money were infused into the economy via the Marshall Plan 
funds, greatly facilitating the reconstruction of West Germany at an astonish-
ing speed. 
After this process of reconstruction was basically complete, the Federal 
Republic's industry increasingly looked abroad for markets. While in 1950 
only 8.5 percent of the GNP was exported, that figure reached 15.9 percent in 
1960, 18.3 percent by 1970 and at present exports account for roughly one-
third of the total GNP.8 By 1976 the FRG in fact exported as many goods as 
France and Great Britain combined. 9 This included electronic data process-
ing equipment 66.1 percent, machinery 46.2 percent, optical equipment 44 per-
cent, auto industry 40 percent, iron and steel industry 39.4 percent, textile 
industry 35.7 percent, non-ferrous metals 34.2 percent, and chemical industry 
34 percent.IO According to government figures, more than 5 million people, 
or 21 percent of the entire workforce in West Germany, have jobs which are 
directly tied to export production, up from only 8 percent in 1950 and 15 
percent in 1960. Industries which export to the Third World alone now account 
for over one million jobs in the FRG.11 
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Almost half (47.5 percent) of all exports in 1980 went to EEC countries, 
while Africa's share amounted to 5.5 percent. If one excludes exports to EEC 
countriesl2, Africa's share rises to 10.5 percent of total exports.13 
According to the EEC, although most of its trade is conducted with the indus-
trialized countries, two-thirds of its positive trade balance is now due to 
its Third World trade.14 
According to the same EEC publication, EEC members are gainj ng ground 
steadily in their competition with the two other major capitalist powers, the 
US and Japan, to win African markets. This, says the report, was done at the 
expense of losing out on some of the markets in South America and Asia.IS 
In emphasizing the importance of the Third World as a ready market for its 
exports, the same publication points out that the effects of the recent reces-
sion would have been considerably worse for the industrialized countries bad 
they not been able to export goods to the Third World, which now imports 37.5 
percent of all EEC exports, compared to 12.5 percent by the US and 9 percent 
by the socialist countries.16 
West German export statistics seem to confirm this point. Trade with 
Africa during 1980 far exceeded increases recorded for other regions. Exports 
to Africa during 1980 rose by 25. 5 percent, out of an increase in total 
exports of only 11 percent. Heading the list once again was South Africa with 
DM 4,595 mnl7, an increase of 46.5 percent over 1979.18 Nigeria was the 
largest customer in black-ruled Africa, followed by Kenya, Zaire, Liberia, 
Ivory Coast, Sudan, Ghana, Tanzania and Angola. 19 The growing importaPce of 
Nigeria as a market for West German goods bas proven astounding. While in 
1967, only DM 244 mn were exported, that figure had reached DM 374 mn by 
1970, 20 and by 1980 the figure was DM 3,321 mn, up 59. 6 percent from the 
previous year alone.21 The FRG now is the second largest supplier of for-
eign goods to Nigeria.22 
When looking at these figures, a few comments concerning their reliability 
seem in order. In an article in the financial pages of a leading West German 
newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the construction industry 
claimed that it is being forced increasingly to enter into agreements with 
Third World countries through foreign subsidiaries because better export cred-
it terms are made available there. France is cited as an example of a country 
granting export credits at a rate of 7. 8 percent, while the same sale made 
directly from West Germany would only be available at an export credit rate of 
13.5 percent. With 68 percent of its new orders last year coming from abroad, 
with an impressive 56 percent of them from LDCs, the industry claims it can no 
longer afford to do any foreign business directly from the FRG.23 The 
implications of this situation for the reliability of statistics published by 
individual countries have not changed. Their transactions have, however, 
shifted from the statistics of one country to another. Thus, a good deal of 
reservation seems appropriate in seeking to assess the relative importance of 
any Third World nation for a particular capitalist country. According to some 
studies, many West German imports and exports are conducted through third 
countries which still have established links to markets from colonial times 
as, for example, France and Great Britain. These sales, then, would merely be 
reflected in West German statistics as trade between fellow EEC members.24 
The same caution applies, mutatis mutandis, to import statistics. While 
direct imports from Africa amounted to 7. 8 percent of total imports, that 
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figure increases to 14.3 percent of total West German imports in 1980 if EEC 
trade is excluded.25 These, of course, are only goods which have come 
directly to the FRG without going through a third country. Since regulations 
allow for the free movement of goods across borders of member countri.es, any 
accurate statistical assessment of total West German imports from Africa which 
would take these inter-EEC transfers into account is far beyond the capability 
of the present study. 
Direct imports from Africa into the FRG increased during 1980 by 24.1 
percent, from DM 21.425 mn to DM 26,579 mn. This increase has been largely 
due to the increase in the price of imported crude oil, however. The ten 
largest sub-Saharan exporters to the FRG were, in order of importance, 
Nigeria, Republic of South Africa, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Gabon, Kenya, 
Cameroon, Zaire, Zambia and Tanzania. Nigeria's and South Africa's share of 
imports among these ten top countries amounted to 48 percent.26 West 
Germany is by far the largest customer for goods from Liberia and is also the 
largest importer for Kenyan and Tanzanian products. 27 It is also Zambia's 
largest customer for copper.28 These developments are particularly amazing 
in view of the fact that, as mentioned in the introduction, West Germany was 
no direct heir to a colonial empire, thus being in a competitive disadvantage 
vis-a-vis other capitalist countries such as France and Great Britain. 
The structure of trade with black Africa follows the typical pattern 
between advanced capitalist and Third World countries. Exports to Africa are 
primarily in the form of finished products, while imports are made up prima-
rily of raw materials and other primary commodities. Being only very modestly 
endowed with indigenous raw materials (except for coal and iron ore), West 
Germany has to look abroad for most of its supplies of vital resources. 
According to the Bonn government, more than 40 percent of its imported raw 
materials now come from the Third World.29 Imports from Africa in 1977 were 
primarily in the form of raw materials (75.3 percent of total imports) and 
food products (13.3 percent), while only 5.3 percent were in the form of semi-
finished or finished products.30 In 1975, the FRG looked to Africa for 92.3 
percent of its tropical wood imports, 78.6 percent of imports in cocoa beans, 
67. 3 percent of manganese ore, 32. 6 percent of copper ore, and roughly one-
quarter of its imports of iron ore, phosphate, coffee and cotton. Copper is 
imported from Zambia, Zaire and South Africa, iron ore mainly from Liberia; 
manganese from South Africa and Gabon; coffee primarily from Kenya; cocoa 
beans from the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroon, Togo and Nigeria; cotton mainly 
from the Sudan; and tropical woods from the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Gabon.31 
One final comment about imports from Africa concerns the fact that the 
above statistics do not convey the importance of these products for the FRG. 
Since the terms of trade have deteriorated rapidly for most African countries 
over the past decade, a decline in D--mark expenditures does not necessarily 
indicate a decline in actual import levels if measured by other than price. 
In fact, it often obscures the opposite tendency. For example, while physical 
quantities remained largely the same, copper imports from Zambia to the FRG 
dropped from OM 467 million in 1970 to OM 209 in 1972, due almost exclusively 
to a decline in copper prices on the world market. 32 A recent study has 
revealed that the financial loss to the developing countries of these deterio-
rating terms of trade amounts to $80 billion for the years 1973 to 1979 
alone.33 As Mandel, among many others, has pointed out, the seemingly 
"equal" exchange between producers of raw materials and highly finished 
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products "at world prices" represents yet another mechanism for extracting 
surplus on the part of the economically more advanced country.34 
Africa's importance for West German direct foreign private investments has 
seen a steady deterioration relative to other regions over the past ten years. 
Even when discounting FRG investments in other EEC countries, Africa's share 
dropped from 8.1 percent in 1978 to 6.9 percent in 1980. The most important 
block African countries for direct foreign private investments as of 1980 are, 
in rank order, Nigeria, Liberia, Kenya, Zaire, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Ga1'on, 
Tanzania, Togo and Congo Brazzaville.35 
West German private investments in sub-Saharan Africa follow a pattern 
dictated by the need for raw materials coupled with the need to safeguard 
market shares through local investments.36 At the end of 1964, these in-
vestments amounted to only OM 214 million, a figure which had almost doubled 
by 1971. As of December, 1980, they totaled OM 1,026 million, an increase of 
480 percent over the past sixteen years. Despite these impressive gains, 
their relative unimportance numerically can been seen by comparing these 
investments to the amounts invested in South Africa alone: by the end of 
1980, the cumulative investment total for private direct investments in South 
Africa was OM 677. 9 million, according to official statistics. 37 As will be 
discussed below, actual South African investment levels are much higher even 
than those given here. 
The relative lack of interest in private direct investments in black 
Africa is not to be interpreted as a general disinterest on the part of West 
German investors in the Third World - over one-fourth of all FRG foreign 
investments now are in underdeveloped countries. 38 In fact, by 1975, West 
Germany had become the second largest exporter of private capital to the 
developing world, surpassed only by the United States.39 One distinguishing 
characteristic of these West German investments is, however, that over two-
thirds of them are in the manufacturing sector with relatively few strong 
investments in raw materials and minerals. It thus stands to reason that what 
keeps private investments in black Africa down is the fact that infrastructure 
is still so underdeveloped, compared to other regions, that only minimal prof-
its can be made in anything but the extractive sector. As the World Bank 
described this situation, the scarcity and high cost of suitably 
skilled labor and management remain major impediments to African industriali-
zation."40 
Thus, as Magdoff has pointed out, the ability to extract profits via 
extensive direct investments is limited "by the very conditions imposed by the 
operation of imperialism. Restricted market demand and industrial backward-
ness are products of the lopsided economic and social structures associated 
with the transformation of these countries into suppliers of raw materials and 
food for the metropolitan centers. "41 Industrial per capita l'roduction in 
sub-Saharan Africa is $21, compared to $208 in Latin America, $624 in South 
Africa, $1,500 in North America and $1,512 in Western Europe.42 
A word of caution concerning the reported levels of foreign direct invest-
ments is in order, however. Official West German statistics only reflect 
cumulative direct transaction amounts but not reinvested profits. The OECD in 
a study has estimated, in fact, that West German direct investments are under-
reported by 40 percent. 43 An additional factor complicating the picture is 
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the fact that all investment transactions completed via third country holding 
companies do not enter the FRG statistics. 44 That a considerable number of 
Third World investments are undertaken in this manner can be inferred from the 
fact that "holding companies, at DM 12.9 billion or well over one-fifth of all 
West German investments, have been the largest single outlet for the nation's 
foreign investments. "45 As has been pointed out, knowledge of these dis-
crepancies does not entirely invalidate the investment statistics, however, 
because these do convey a sense of the dynamic in the development of these 
investments and do reflect the main trends in capital exports.46 
In a sense, it could be argued that it has become almost impossible, 
unless one is prepared to scrutinize the activities of capital in all states, 
to produce statistics about trade and investments which convey the real pic-
ture. The "international" wing of capital has become so enmeshed across 
national boundaries that it seems almost useless, for example, to speak of 
certain industrial sectors as "West German." If one looks at those sectors 
which are most export-dependent in the FRG, for example, one is struck by the 
fact that most of them (such as electrical/electronic, the auto industry, iron 
and steel, chemicals, etc.) are also the favorites of foreign (particularly 
US) investors in the Federal Republic. To complicate the picture even fur-
ther, it is these same sectors which are among the leaders of West German 
direct foreign investments abroad. 47 For these sectors it has obviously 
become a difficult task to speak of "national bourgeois interests" and the 
analysis should in many ways take place at the international level, although 
this is outside the scope of the present study. 
The Bonn Government and Black-ruled Africa 
Relations between the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
African states since the time of their independence have been marked by almost 
the same asymmetry which characterizes economic relations between the two. 
Bonn's interest in Africa has been motivated primarily by self-interest. This 
was manifested until the late 1960s largely by seeking support for the FRG' s 
claim to be the sole representative of the German people; a diplomatic initia-
tive borne of Cold War politics. Since that time, these relations have con-
centrated on an "intensified integration into an asymmetrical international 
division of labor which turns a large number of African states either into the 
fruit and vegetable garden of Western Europe or into suppliers of labor-
intensive industrial goods."48 
It would obviously be naive to assume that governments do not act out of 
self-interest in their dealings with one another. However, as Rainer Tetzlaff 
has pointed out, what is of decisive importance is who defines this interest 
and at the expense of whom. 49 It is argued herethat relations between 
Africa and Bonn have been conducted primarily for the economic and political 
benefit of the FRG, despite Bonn's insistence that they are carried out on the 
basis of "partnership. "50 Furthermore, given the fact that these African 
states are firmly embedded structurally in the international capitalist sys-
tem, there seems to be little that can be done to ameliorate this relationship 
of subordination short of a revolutionary change in the class and consequent 
productive relationships existing in the dominated African countries. 
At the time of independence for most of black Africa, and with full 
backing of its Western "allies," the Bonn government aggressively pursued a 
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foreign policy which made the Deutschlandfrage the litmus test of relations 
with other countries. Claiming to be the sole representative of all of the 
German people, it either never established or broke relations immediately with 
any nation recognizing the socialist part of Germany - the German Democratic 
Republic. This so-called Hallstein Doctrine determined the early relations 
between Bonn and newly independent Africa. Just like their mentors in 
Washington, the West German politicians saw the world as a Manichean one, 
divided into two hostile camps. Their own divided country served as a con-
stant reminder of this fact. After repeated prodding from Washington to get 
more involved in the defense of the so-called free world,51 the Bonn govern-
ment did so by manipulating new nations into supporting the FRG on the "German 
question" by using a carrot and stick approach. Granting Bonn the prerogative 
of speaking for the entire German people meant, among other things, economic 
"aid." Challenging this claim brought about drastic diplomatic, political and 
economic repercussions. 
According to Rainer Tetzlaff, the guidelines of the Bonn government which 
informed its policy vis-a-vis the new states of Africa in the Adenauer era 
were as follows: 
(1) Support of Bonn's claim to be the sole political representative of the 
German people, as well as support for free elections to ensure the German 
peoples' right to national self-determination; 
(2) Maintenance of diplomatic non-recognition of the GDR by third coun-
tries (the only exception here was the Soviet Union); 
(3) Prevention of the developing countries coming under the communist 
"sphere of influence;" 
(4) Establishment of permanent and friendly relations between Western 
Europe and independent Africa on the basis of economic complementarity and 
ideological compatibility; 
(5) Continuation 
Africa, granting full 
white minority rule.52 
of the traditionally close relations with Southern 
support and recognition to the political status quo of 
The Hallstein Doctrine, in narrow political terms, would only have 
required a policy in line with the first two of these policy positions. Those 
in power in Bonn, however, saw themselves as co-defenders of the entire system 
of capitalism (the "free world"), which to them had proven itself to be so 
viable and successful in their own country. Consequently, anti-communism 
became a leitmotiv of relations with the newly decolonized world. 
During the rapid process of decolonization itself, the Bonn government had 
made much of the fact that it, too, was a "new" state and that there was much 
similarity between the Deutschlandfrage and colonized peoples' struggles for 
self-determination. That true self-determination (i.e., without "communist 
interference") would lead both Germany and the colonized world firmly to 
establish a system along bourgeois lines was a contention which seemed a self-
evident truth to the Bonn policymakers. This line of reasoning has persisted 
up to the present and attempts by any African country to free itself from 
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economic dependence on the international capitalist system is still immedi-
ately explained in the simple dichotomy of the Cold War; i.e., that moves in 
this direction were simply orchestrated from Moscow. 
The major policy tool of the Bonn government for its relations with the 
Third World has been that if its Entwicklungshilfe - its so-called "develop-
ment aid." During the years of the Hallstein Doctrine (which was allowed to 
wither away quietly during the late sixties), it was the "German Question" 
which largely determined eligibility for the "development aid," as is exempli-
fied by the following passage from a 1964 official Bonn publication: 
The special political situation of Germany and the goal of 
reunion desired by the overwhelming majority of Germans on 
both sides of separated Germany has once again strongly 
influenced the development policy of the federal govern-
ment during the past year. The federal government, 
through its development assistance, is attempting to win 
over the developing countries to an attitude of under-
standing for the German cause.53 
That this "development aid" had very little to do with Third World devel-
opment can also been seen by the fact that the first budget ever approved by 
the Bundestag containing development assistance in 1957 for "technical assist-
ance" in the amount of DM 50 million was to be allocated by the Foreign Minis-
try. The latter saw the primary purpose of "aid" to be a tool of Western 
Containment policy "to block the advance of communism. "54 The creation of a 
federal ministry charged officially with development matters in 1961 did not 
affect this approach to "aid." The ministry, named Bundesministerium ftir 
wirschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ) had only limited say in the allocation of 
funds while the Foreign Ministry, with increasing competition from the Finance 
and Commerce Ministries, was the main determinant of how "aid" funds should be 
distributed. It was not until the SPD/FDP coalition came to power in 1969 
that the BMZ finally was granted decision-making authority in the allocation 
of capital aid funds.55 As one West German analyst has pointed out, how-
ever, even at the present time the BMZ is the weakest link within the federal 
"aid" budgeting process, with "the finance ministry determining the level of 
ODA funding, the Foreign Ministry playing a decisive role in the distribution 
of funds to individual countries, using fundamentally political criteria. 
and the economic ministry in most cases determining the precise direction for 
all other areas pertaining to development policy."56 
With the criteria for "aid" established on such a basis, it should come as 
no surprise that these funds have functioned mainly to serve the interests of 
West German capital. These criteria could be grouped into two distinct peri-
ods: while "development aid" was used until roughly the economic recession of 
1966-67 to make West Germany safe for capitalism, it has since been used to 
make the Third World safe for West German capitalism. 
The role which the Bonn government plays directly in promoting economic 
activity between West German companies and the Third World as part of its 
official "development assistance" program can be broken into 3 main areas: 
(1) export promotion; (2) facilitating the flow of investment capital; and (3) 
securing much needed minerals and other raw materials. This last role has 
only surfaced after the OPEC 1973/74 oil embargo, which showed the extreme 
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importance to West German industry of imported raw materials. As one govern-
ment report has portrayed this situation: 
Imports from developing countries, for example, account 
for 55 percent of the iron ore, 72 percent of the copper, 
95 percent of the crude oil, and 100 percent of the tin 
ore used in domestic consumption. Dependence on a few 
tropical agricultural products such as coffee, cocoa, and 
tea is total. It is also high for agricultural raw mate-
rials for industry (cotton about 60 percent, rubber about 
80 percent, just about 90 percent).57 
The report goes on to say that, since the securing of raw materials is the 
responsibility of the private sector in the FRG, these private activities are 
supported by the government through its "development assistance" program. 
Following are the main instruments through which the Bonn government seeks 
to protect export markets and private direct investments:58 
1. Exports to underdeveloped countries are insured by the federal govern-
ment through the Hermes Exportkreditversicherungs-AG in Hamburg. These export 
guarantees compensate exporters for any losses they might incur in their busi-
ness transactions with financially weak partners. Hermes approves guarantees 
only for projects which appear economically sound (by standards determined 
mainly by short-term West German criteria of "profitability" and not necessar-
ily by those which might pay off in the long-term by promoting a balanced 
overall development) and for countries which have good credit ratings in the 
international landing business. According to Bonn, 9.1 percent of all West 
German exports in 1978, amounting to DM 32 billion, were insured by Hermes 
credits. Of this, 78 percent were export guarantees to Third World coun-
tries.59 
The normal procedure for obaining an export credit guarantee is for a West 
German exporter to submit a detailed application to the so-called "Hermes 
Committee". The Foreign Ministry as well as the Ministries of Finance, Com-
merce, and Economic Cooperation all are represented on this body. If the 
application is accepted, it is up to the exporter, armed with the Hermes guar-
antee, to obtain credit either from the Kreditanstalt filr Wiederaufbau (KW) or 
from a commercial bank. The accumulated debt of LDCs to the FRG just for 
export credits along amounted to DM 49.8 billion by 1978.60 
2. The Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (Credit Institute for Reconstruc-
tion), founded after the Second World War to distribute Marshall Plan funds to 
aid in West Germany's reconstruction and now serving as the FRG's development 
bank, provides easy financing for German exporters once they have received a 
Hermes guarantee. During 1977, DM 208.9 million were provided for exports to 
sub-Saharan exports. According to the KW, by 1978 the accumulated debt of 
black Africa for credit extended by that institution through export financing 
along was DM 2,194.1 million. 61 The KW also handles all bi-lateral loan 
arrangements which are approved by the BMZ as capital aid to underdeveloped 
countries. 
3. Foreign private direct investments are protected 
treaties which the Bonn government enters into with LDCs. 
through special 
These investment 
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promotion treaties, among the toughest in the capitalist world, regulate the 
free flow of capital and profits, insure non-discriminatory treatment of the 
West German investor, provide for immediate and unencumbered compensation 
payment in case the business is nationalized, and secure access for the West 
German investor to an impartial judiciary in case of disputes. 62 Further-
more, according to the standard preamble of these treaties, they should serve 
to "deepen economic cooperation between the two states • • • in the recogni-
tion that promotion and legal protection of these capital investments are 
conducive to a more active economic initiative as well as to an increase in 
the economic well-being of both peoples. "63 Article I of the treaty text 
then calls on the signatories to promote reciprocal capital investments in the 
other's country - somewhat of a joke to capital-poor Third World countries who 
do not make it a habit to invest their own capital in the developed West. 
In case of nationalization or any other losses to the West German investor 
stemming from political causes, the federal government provides for its for-
eign investors a financial guarantee for 95 percent of the loss incurred. 
This is administered through the privately-run Treuarbeit AG in Hamburg. Any 
claims an investor might have against the government of bis host country thus 
revert to the Bonn government or, to put it more exactly, to the West German 
taxpayer. 
4. One final way in which the FRG government promotes investments in the 
Third World is through its LDC Taxation Law, which provides tax exemptions for 
investments in these countries. As has been pointed out, this law is "nothing 
more than an instrument to promote private direct investments via tax subsi-
dies. "64 In addition, treaties to prevent double taxation have been entered 
into with forty LDCs to date, with obvious advantages for West German multi-
nationals. According to the Bonn government, these schemes are intended not 
only to make investments in LDCs "easier" but also "to contribute to a secure 
supply of raw materials, "65 again pointing out the increasing concern of the 
federal government about the country's enormous dependence on imported raw 
materials. 
Since the FRG counts this investment promotion as part of its "development 
aid" effort to the Third World, it is of interest to note the results of a 
1976 study performed for the United National Industrial Development Organiza-
tion (UNIDO), which sought to determine the structure and volume of West 
German private investments in the Third World. This study shows, not surpris-
ingly, that the top five reasons which the responding firms gave for investing 
in LDC' s are: 
1. Preventing a reduction of sales by being nearer the market; 
2. Lower costs of production and transport; 
3. Avoiding import restrictions (tariff barriers, import quotas, etc.); 
4. Bigger profits expected due to lower rates of taxation; and 
5. Labor shortages in West Germany.66 
"Assuring the supply of raw materials (due to fears, for instance, that 
exports of certain materials may be forbidden) "67 was offered as the sixth 
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most important reason for the Third World overall, but actually headed the 
list in the case of investments made in Africa. Promoting direct investments 
in Africa thus appears to be particularly important for energy-poor West 
Germany. 
Since one of the declared goals of West German development aid policy is 
to integrate the Third World into the capitalist world economy to an ever 
larger extent, or, as the Bonn government puts it, to establish "a system of 
global partnership, "68 it set up an agency in 1962 to promote investments in 
the Third World by small- and medium-sized West German companies. The 
Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellscbaft (DEG) sponsors private foreign direct 
investments between West German firms and "partners" in the Third World. The 
base capital of the agency at present amounts to DM 1 billion and it "aids" 
development by setting up joint ventures which promise to "realize profits" 
after an initial period, during which time the DEG underwrites the risk to the 
German investor. 69 One of the many pictures in the DEG' s Annual Report for 
1980 shows two beautifully tanned white couples (one supposedly is expected to 
think that they are West Germans) lounging on a sailboat on beautifully clear 
blue water, with vacation bungalows with a distinctly "African" look in the 
background. This tourists' paradise is presented as an example of a success-
ful joint-venture operation in Kenya. One is forced to ask bow, other than in 
terms of profits for a few entrepreneurs in both countries, this vacation 
village for sun-seeking Europeans bas benefitted the "development" of the 
Kenyan people. Yet investments of this type are considered part of the Feder-
al Republic's "development aid package"! 
From the beginning of its operations, Africa has been the focal point of 
the DEG's activities.70 In 1979, 55 percent (DM 59.6 million) of its new 
investments went to Africa, where its accumulated total investments via joint 
ventures with African "partners" now amounts to DM 605. 6 million. 71 In 
fact, by 1978 a full 11 percent of all West German direct investments in 
Africa were funded by the DEG, with DEG investments representing o.ver one-half 
of the entire West German capital invested in eight African countries. 72 
According to Dr. E. BUltmann of the DEG, the reason for this heavy emphasis on 
Africa is that the agency concentrates on countries which are only "ripe" for 
private investments in a very limited way due to the backward nature of the 
infrastructure, banking system, capital market, etc.73 As Dr. BUltmann's 
remarks indicate, the DEG sees its function as one of building up this infra-
structure until the country is "ripe" for regular private investments that 
will yield higher levels of profit. 
The DEG nevertheless encourages German industry to invest in these "un-
ripe" countries by offering loans at a very low interest rate and by itself 
participating financially in the venture until the project bas become profit-
able. As this program is executed under the concept of "partnership," the DEG 
finds investment "partners" in the LDC who will participate in the venture by 
putting up a share of the initial investment capital. The DEG thus not only 
helps German industry to invest in underdeveloped counties without these com-
panies assuming any financial risks, but it also benefits the capitalist sec-
tor in the host LDCs by setting up these joint ventures. As James O'Connor 
bas pointed out, "joint ventures and partnerships are up-to-date versions of 
the colonial policy of creating a dependent, passive local bourgeoisie •••• 
The alliance between foreign and local capital inhibits potential competition 
and paves the way for the diversification of the foreign operations of the 
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international monopolies, and extends their control over related product 
fields in the local economy."74 
By far the largest individual sector in which the DEG invests is in devel-
opment banks, which in 1978 received 32 percent of all new DEG funds. 75 
This allows the DEG to appoint a representative to the administrative com-
mittee of the recipient bank. According to the DEG 1976 Annual Report, the 
company invests in development banks "if such a participation benefits the 
German investor. By its participation in the administrative committees the 
DEG is able, among other things, to discover investment possibilities and 
project ideas for German partners and to offer them additional advice on how 
to adjust their investments optimally to local investment planning. "76 As 
Dr. Bllltmann explained in the 1975 interview: "The function of the DEG is to 
save a place (for West German industry) and to acquire information regarding 
investment possibilities, knowledge of economic sectors, markets, and the 
official bureaucracies, especially in those underdeveloped countires which, in 
the past, have either been ignored by German companies or have not been easily 
accessible to them so that we pave the way for potential investors. "77 In 
its 1978 Annual Report, the DEG proudly points to the successes of its invest-
ment approach. States the DEG: "With this farreaching development bank net-
work, the DEG has been able to increase the number of its services to poten-
tial German investors."78 
Despite these glowing descriptions of success, the DEG has come under 
increasing attack in West Germany lately for not doing what it was established 
to do - assist small and medium-sized companies in gaining a foothold in the 
Third World. The DEG had to admit to a parliamentary committee recently that 
only 30 percent of its joint ventures in the Third World were set up with 
small or medium-sized West German "partners. "79 Since a medium-sized firm 
is any company not part of the largest 100 West German corporations, this 
reveals that most of the DEG's investment efforts were concentrated on cooper-
ative ventures with large West German corporations, that wing of the FRG' s 
industry which would be "international" in ambition even without this type of 
direct government assistance. In fact, out of the 20 top earners in the FRG 
in 1979, six were themselves foreign corporations, according to a recent study 
by one of the FRG's leading commercial banks.BO 
This apparent attempt by the Bonn government to promote the "national" 
sector of its economy in an environment which favors international capital has 
failed. The DEG has defended itself by stating that many medium-sized firms 
"lack the risk capital, the planning capacities, the experience abroad, infor-
mation concerning investment opportunities and conditions, management capaci-
ties, experience in joint venture, experience in overcoming administrative 
obstacles in developing countries, shortages in expert capacities as well as 
in language skills. "81 Since by contrast international capital possesses 
these resources national capital (or what the Bonn government calls "small and 
medium-sized companies") clearly is unable to compete. The same recent inves-
tigations have revealed that the DEG has also violated its mandate by invest-
ing 52 percent of its 1979 funds in the more advanced, and thus more profit-
able, developing countries rather than aiding capital investments in the most 
economically backward countries. 82 The DEG ought, nevertheless, not to be 
attacked too vigorously for violating its mandate by operating increasingly in 
more advanced LDCs and mainly in cooperation with West German multinational 
corporations, simply because it cannot control the inherent tendencies of 
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capitalism itself. And, as the DEG points out in its 1979 Annual Report, 
lacking infrastructures are becoming ever greater obstacles to its promotion 
of profitable foreign investments, thus making a reversal of present invest-
ment trends even more unlikely. 
Direct government-to-government economic relations are largely executed in 
the form of "aid" commitments on the part of the Bonn government. Roughly 70 
percent of West German official development assistance (ODA) is handled 
directly with individual Third World countries on a bi-lateral basis, with the 
remaining 30 percent contributed to multilateral "aid" agencies such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, the Economic Development Fund, or to such institutions 
as regional development banks. 83 The Bonn government just announced its 
planned participation in the African Development Bank with DM 424.4 milion, 
"reflecting," as the semi-official Afrika journal phrased it, "the positive 
German evaluation of the development-policy work done by (this) financing 
institution. It also strengthens German economic and political relations with 
the countries of Africa."84 
Bi-lateral ODA takes two forms - capital aid or technical aid. Capital 
aid is not officially tied to the purchase of West German products, except for 
shipbuilding, locomotives, nuclear power stations and engineering consult-
ing.85 These funds are "project-tied," however, which is, as Paul Streeten 
has observed, a "banking approach to aid, looking at each project in isolation 
and giving the aid, provided the project satisfies certain economic, commer-
cial and managerial criteria. "86 Bonn thus keeps tight control on the types 
of projects for which it provides funds, making certain that they satisfy 
capitalist criteria of profitability. It also protects the interests of its 
export industry by tying these funds to the utilization by the recipient coun-
try of West German private consulting services, which naturally have a tenden-
cy to recommend West German products. In fact, the West German government 
estimates that the preponderent share of the capital provided never leaves the 
country but stays in the form of purchases of goods and services. 87 This 
was confirmed in a study conducted by a Swiss research institute - Prognus AG 
- published in April, 1978, according to which of the DM 3.48 billion in 
capital aid provided in 1976, DM 2.3 billion stayed in the FRG, securing 
42,000 jobs. 88 
As Klaus Godemer has pointed out, this high percentage of funds staying in 
the FRG is also attributable to a conscious government policy of frequently 
approving funds for projects only after a West German firm has been awarded 
the contract, thus reversing the general procedure of approving funds first 
and then inviting tenders. Many LDCs also promise to award the contracts to a 
German firm when they first approach Bonn for a loan to finance a planned 
project in the hope that this might enhance their chances of getting the "aid" 
application approved.89 
Sectoral emphasis of bi-lateral aid is in infrastructural development, 
with transportation and communications systems taking the highest share at 20 
percent, followed by education, science, and technical training with roughly 
15 percent each, and the manufacturing sector with 11 percent. In 1979, DM 
500 million (or slightly more than 8 percent of total funding) "was used for 
projects concerned with obtaining energy from hydroelectric schemes and coal, 
and from the sun and wind." Agricultural development was funded with slightly 
less than 10 percent of the total budget.90 
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It is important to keep in mind that these funds, despite their "aid" 
label, are repayable loans,91 The Bonn government was owed a total of DM 
34,38 billion by Third World countries as of 31 December 1978,92 As of 
January, 1980, the following ten sub-Saharan African countries had been the 
main recipients of West German capital aid (the total amount owed to the FRG 
in ODA is shown parenthetically in millions of D-marks): 1, Sudan (666,6); 2, 
Tanzania (484,17); 3, Kenya (468,6); 4, Ghana (391,1); 5, Cameroon (369,3); 6, 
Ivory Coast (313,2); 7, Zaire (311.2); 8, Togo (281,54); 9, Zambia (264,1); 
10. Senegal (224,05), Nigeria, as a member country of OPEC, has been ineligi-
ble for ODA since 1974, but according to a recent BMZ publication was the 
recipient of DM 325 million in capital aid before that year, 93 Repayment 
schedules for MSACs (those very poor countries most seriously affected by the 
oil price rise) follow IDA conditions (0.75 percent interest repayable over 50 
years, with a ten-year grace period), For advanced LDCs with per capita in-
comes of at least $500 in 1972, loans must be repaid over 20 years, with a 
five-year grace period and at an interest rate of 4, 5 percent. All other 
LDCs, except for the 30 poorest countries (LLDCs), receive loans at standard 
conditions of 2 percent interest repayable over 30 years with a ten-year grace 
period, In what amounted to a substantial shift in policy, the FRG in 1978 
made all future funds to LDCs available on a non-repayable grant basis,94 
West German technical aid, also executed on a bi-lateral basis, is mainly 
offered on a non-repayable grant basis, 95 Africa has been the traditional 
focal point of technical assistance, with the main recipients by the end of 
1979 Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Sudan, Zaire, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Togo, Mali and 
the Ivory Coast, While total ODA to Africa until 1978 amounted to 47 percent 
in capital and 53 percent in technical assistance, the ODA budget in 1976 and 
1977 had begun a reversal of this trend by offering only 39 percent in the 
form of technical assistance and the remaining 61 percent in the form of 
repayable capital loans,96 
The Gesellschaft filr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), founded in 1975 to 
coordinate technical aid to Third World countries, reports that roughly half 
(DM 1,007 million) of its funds since its inception have been spent on pro-
jects in Africa, 97 The sectoral priorities of the GTZ lie in agriculture, 
forestry, the production of raw materials and in education, Women have become 
another priority of the GTZ, Since the BMZ issued a position paper on the 
role of women in the Third World in February 1978, GTZ experts have apparently 
realized the economic importance of this substantial population group, Thus, 
the GTZ now supports 26 projects which concentrate particularly on women, such 
as "a women's center in the Gambia, education of women in Bamako, Mali and 
consulting on alternative energy sources to a Kenyan women's organization,"98 
According to the GTZ 1978 Annual Report, it sees as one of its main func-
tions to increase the "absorption capacity" of very economically backward 
countries to prepare them for the "investment phase" of "development cred-
its, "99 Thus, the GTZ plays an important precursory role in preparing a 
country for subsequent "development efforts" by West German investors, 
On July 1, 1979, the GTZ opened a special unit called German Appropriate 
Technology Exchange (GATE), which is mainly concerned with alternative energy 
sources and providing information to Third World countries on frequently 
encountered technological problems, 
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According to Bonn, all the programs discussed above which deal with Bonn-
Third World relations (Hermes credits, KW funds, direct foreign investments, 
capital and technical aid) are part of its "development aid" package. Devel-
opment aid, says Bonn, is granted, not just out of an admitted "enlightened 
self-interest," but also out of a sense of "solidarity," out of "humanitarian, 
charitable or Christian motives. "100 As a leading member of the so-called 
Socialist International, the ruling Social Democratic Party also claims to be 
in the position to offer the Third World a viable alternative to both "capi-
talism" and "socialism" - the third way of "democratic socialism. "101 Of 
course, how "democratic socialism," which is characterized by the present West 
German political economy, differs from ordinary modern capitalism is not 
explained. 
As the discussion in this section has shown, however, these self-serving 
assessments on the part of the West German government may not amount to much 
more than yet another example of (as the Marquis de Vauvenarque would say) the 
homage which vice pays to virtue. As was shown above, the FRG's so-called 
"development aid" is designed either to aid West German exports or West German 
private capital investments in the Third World, with long-term development 
successes of any Third World country an incidental and not very likely by-
product. In fact, the FRG lacked firm "development" guidelines until 1971, 
when it finally published its first comprehensive document which attempted to 
give a unified West German government position on the purposes and goals of 
its "aid" program for actual Third World "development." In May, 1979, the 
Bonn government issued revised guidelines for the FRG' s conception of Third 
World "development" but the overall theme remains the same as before; i.e., 
the ·need to integrate the Third World into the international capitalist sys-
tem. "Interdependence" is one of Bonn's favorite themes, and it never seems 
to tire of pointing out that those problems which do exist in this present 
relationship can be solved "without forfeiting the positive traits of the 
existing international order. The federal government is of the opinion that 
the existing order is in need and capable of improvement and that developing 
countries must be more strongly integrated into the global economic 
order. "102 Insisting that a reformist approach to current problems such as 
racial domination or dire poverty is the only viable approach toward their 
solution, the Bonn government is one of the staunchest supporters of "peace-
ful" solutions in Southern Africa. It is to the history and application of 
the Weltanschauung on the part of the Bonn government vis-a-vis the liberation 
struggles against white minority rule in Africa that we turn in the following 
section. 
IV. Bonn's Friedenspolitik - Peace for Whom? 
Since the West German state's post-war creation allowed it to be unencum-
bered by the stigma of having been a colonial power, it has made the notion of 
"equality" between it and the former colonial dependencies of the Third World 
one of its favorite themes. As discussed in section III, Bonn used its own 
historical circumstance of being a divided nation as a point of comparison 
between the whole of Germany and struggles for national self-determination 
elsewhere. It bas portrayed itself as one of the "little guys" of the world 
which, as the second thesis of its recently published "Theses for a Policy of 
Cooperation with the Developing Countries" states, is against "the establish-
ment of zones of influence by foreign powers in the Third World. "103 
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Just as those of its Western allies, however, these statements have not 
meant that West Germany grants Africans the right to choose freely their own 
political and economic destinies. On the contrary, Bonn has been one of the 
staunchest supporters of a dominant Western influence in Africa out of fear 
that black Africa might "turn red," an often-voiced concern in ruling cir-
cles, The fact that the Bonn government has not played as large a role in 
Africa politically or militarily as has France, for example, is certainly not 
due to an overriding sense of letting Africans decide their own destinies, but 
rather is a consequence of West Germany's own historical circumstances. As 
one observer has noted, the maxim of Bonn's policy vis-a-vis Africa can be 
reduced to "what is beneficial for the West is good for Africa. "104 When 
Bonn thus speaks of establishing "zones of influence," in Africa, it means 
only the Soviet Union and other socialist countries which are trying to take 
away what naturally belongs to the West. 
Bonn maintains close, albeit not always openly displayed, links to the 
regime in South Africa, while its history of (non) support for anti-colonial 
struggles is a dismal one. This section will give a brief overview of West 
German ties to South Africa as well as to the positions taken by Bonn regard-
ing anti-colonial struggles against Portuguese colonialism and the Rhodesian 
settlers. 
South Africa's great mineral resources, coupled with an abundance of cheap 
labor and an "excellent investment climate," have long made it a favorite in 
West German business circles. As pointed out in section II, South Africa is 
the leading importer of West German goods on the African continent and ranks 
second in exports to West Germany from sub-Saharan Africa, It should be 
pointed out in this regard, however, that Nigeria, which ranks ahead of South 
Africa in exports to the FRG, holds this position exclusively because of its 
export of crude oil, while imports from South Africa include other vital 
minerals such as platinum, chrome, vanadium, and manganese. There can be 
little doubt that South Africa is more important to the FRG economically than 
any other individual sub-Saharan country. 
In fact, it ranks overall in 14th place among the most important West 
German customers and, if one discounts FRG exports to other EEC member coun-
tries, South Africa ranks an impressive seventh for all West German ex-
ports.104a 
According to Bonn statistics, direct foreign investments in South Africa 
since 1951 amount to DM 678 million - a figure which is at variance with those 
supplied by West German industry itself, which has estimated its invest- ment 
interests in South Africa as roughly amounting to DM 6 billion.105 South 
African figures, on the other hand, indicate that West German invest- ments as 
of 1976 amounted to DM 4 billion.106 It thus seems impossible to determine 
the exact amount of direct foreign investments in South Africa, except to 
state with certainty they are considerably larger than those report- ed in 
official West German statistics. Roughly 300 West German companies have South 
African subsidiaries and their profits are protected from taxation if returned 
to West Germany because of a double taxation treaty signed with Pretoria in 
1973, which was retroactive to 1965.107 
Bonn's official position on the system of apartheid is a very "correct" 
one; i .e,, its voting record in the United Nations mirrors that of other 
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Western countries in its mild condemnation of the Pretoria regime, Also in 
line with its allies, Bonn has shown an absolute unwillingness to support 
drastic political or economic sanctions against it, The FRG did vote for the 
mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in November 1977, In fact, the 
FRG's official position on the UN security Council call for a weapons embargo 
in 1963 was to heed this call and officially not to permit shipments of weap-
ons to South Africa, Despite these public stands, Bonn has come under heavy 
attack for its cooperation with the Pretoria regime, however, Military equip-
ment of West German origin has surfaced in South Africa often and the FRG has 
come under attack from such organization as the OAU and the African National 
Congress for its military cooperation with Pretoria,109 In addition, there 
has been growing evidence over the years of nuclear cooperation between the 
two countries,110 
Since Bonn's policy on transition from white minority to black majority 
governments is one which rejects anything but what it calls "peaceful change" 
- part of its so-called "friedenspolitik" - its ties to black liberation 
groups are almost non-existent. In fact, as Reinhard Rode has pointed out, 
this "peace policy" puts the responsibility for change into the hands of those 
who hold the power - the white minority governments, while blacks are ex-
pected to wait "peacefully" until such changes are "granted,"111 West 
German distrust of those Africans who do not agree with these tactical ideas 
on bringing about change is widespread, In fact, Franz Josef Strauss, the 
opposition leader, has openly referred to national liberation groups as "ter-
rorist organizations" and claimed in a July 1978 interview with the West 
German newsmagazine Der Spiegel that blacks would always take a gun over a 
loaf of bread because "they have an inner drive to kill one another,"112 
The racism inherent in this statement unfortunately mirrors in some 
respects general public opinion in West Germany, as Manfred Paeffgen has shown 
in his extensive study of West German attitudes concerning Black Africa,113 
Germans, not known historically for their tolerance of other cultures and 
races, appear to have a heavy bias in favor of South Africa's whites and show 
a great deal of ignorance and insensitivity about black grievances, This 
attitude of cultural superiority vis-a-vis non-whites is perpetuated by a 
press which concentrates its coverage either on crisis situations or stories 
with a highly "exotic" content, thus portraying Africans either as blood-
thirsty warriors or as peaceful and happy children of nature who love to clap 
their hands as they move their bodies in very un-German rhythms,114 
In this connection it is important to keep in mind, however, that these 
arrogant views held by the majority of West Germans are no accident, That 
this chauvinism is not some sort of genetically determined German trait is 
seen by the fact that the "other Germany," the GDR, has consistently supported 
black struggles throughout Africa and has lent open political as well as mate-
rial support to liberation movements,115 What may one infer from these vast 
differences between the "two Germanies" in Africa? It is argued here that 
West Germany supports white minority regimes, not just in South Africa but, 
until their demise, also in the Portuguese colonies and in Rhodesia, because 
of the (even if short-lived) benefits West German capital derives from it, 
The attitudes of the West German people regarding black Africa thus are to a 
large extent reflections of the ideological package served to them in the 
interests of capitalist exploitation of (non-white) South Africa, 
19 
Before Portugal "lost" its African colonies, it could count on the steady 
support of its friends in Bonn. This friendship between the two countries 
dated back to the establishment of the FRG and the warm welcome offered this 
newest member of the "free world" by one of Europe's two remaining fascist 
regimes. In fact, Salazar was one of Bonn's most important supporters in the 
early days of their existence. Salazar and Adenauer saw themselves in basic 
agreement in their Catholicism and their views of a Christian occident.116 
These warm ties of friendship left no room on the part of Bonn for sup-
porting anti-colonial struggles, even if some members of the SPD/FDP showed 
slightly more understanding for them. In 1961, an economic cooperation treaty 
was signed between the two countries which gave the FRG an economic foothold 
in Portugal's African possessions. By 1970, the FRG has become the largest 
supplier of Angola, with the West German multinational Krupp AG, involved in 
the mining of iron ore. Seventy percent of Angola's exports to the FRG in 
fact consisted of iron ore, a resource upon which the FRG is heavily import 
dependent.117 The climax of Bonn-Lisbon cooperation in Africa came with 
West Germany's active support for the construction of the Cabora Basa dam, a 
project which was vehemently opposed by FRELIM0 nationalists. It is interest-
ing to note in this regard that despite these objections, the FRG held the 
FRELIM0 government responsible for credits extended by Bonn to the Porguguese 
for the Cabora Basa construction. In fact, the Kreditznstalt fijr Wiederaufbau 
listed DM 285.6 million owed to it by Mozambique in its 1977 Annual Report, a 
debt going back to 1970 when the country was still a Portuguese colony!ll8 
The fact that Bonn considered all of Southern Africa "safe" before the 
independence of the Portuguese colonies can also be seen from the regional 
emphasis of its "development aid" to sub-Saharan Africa up to 1977: 
Credits Grants 119 
West Africa 1,918.55 1,127.29 
Central Africa 1,915.13 1,233.17 
East Africa 1,237.33 1,126.23 
Southern Africa 438.80 246.42 
Now that only South Africa and Namibia remain in white minority control, 
Bonn suddenly has discovered the "development" needs of the southern part of 
the continent. 
Within the framework of the "Concerted Action for Development in Africa" 
(ADCA), founded at the beginning of 1980, Bonn has pledged DM 565 million to 
develop existing rail links in Southern Africa benefitting mainly Zambia, 
Malawi, and Botswana.120 In its 1979 Annual Report, the BMZ states that it 
"intensified" its effort during that year to "strengthen the economies of 
those countries at the edge of the conflict. Southern Africa even received 
its own thesis in the seventeen "Theses for a Policy of Cooperation with the 
Developing Countries," mentioned above. Thesis 15, entitled "Southern 
Africa," reads: "The federal government endorses an end to racial discrimina-
tion in Southern Africa. It supports the frontline states in the conflict in 
Southern Africa. The federal government is willing to support such activities 
on the part of liberation movements which aim at peaceful and democratic 
.structures in the still dependent areas. "122 
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Despite these pious utterances, it seems clear that Bonn once again is 
looking out for its own interests by including the frontline states in its 
"peace policy;" i.e., trying to prevent them from radicalizing their own posi-
tions vis-a-vis the capitalist West. In Zimbabwe, independent since April 
1980, the FRG has also become a generous "aid" donor, with Foreign Minister 
Genscher pledging DM 7 million in technical assistance at the independence 
ceremonies on 18 April 1980. Cooperative ventures are planned between the 
(West German) Federal Agency for Geo-Sciences and Raw Materials (BGR) and the 
(Zimbabwe) Ministry of Mines. The DEG is also reported already looking for 
deserving "development partners" in Zimbabwe for its client companies at 
home.123 Reflecting his country's urgent interest in Zimbabwe, West German 
development minister Rainer 0ffergeld (a more appropriate name couldn't have 
been invented) visited Salisbury in July 1980, signing an agreement for cred-
its in the amount of DM 50 million for the rebuilding of roads, bridges, and 
wells.124 
The speed with which the Bonn government "welcomed" the black nation of 
Zimbabwe into the family of (Western?) nations is truly surprising if one 
considers the consistent lack of support for the preceeding liberation strug-
gle. In fact, the Bonn government had even refused the entry of high-level 
ZANU representatives into West Germany in April 1978, who were coming to pick 
up funds collected for ZANU in a nation-wide campaign. They were detained at 
the airport in Frankfurt for a day and night before being forced to leave 
again. This was justified by Bonn on the basis that the purchase of military 
equipment with these funds "would lead to difficulties in foreign affairs with 
Rhodesia" - fears which are quite amazing, considering the outlaw status of 
the Ian Smith regime in the international community. Instead, the funds col-
lected were impounded by the state of Baden-Wlirttemberg (in which the bank 
where the money had been deposited was located) and later turned over to the 
West German Red Cross to "aid the aborigines of Rhodesia. "125 
The picture which thus emerges about West Germany's "Friedenspolitik" in 
Afria is simply that this policy is primarily designed to maintain the status 
quo. Although Bonn claims to pursue a policy vis-a-vis white regimes which 
divorces trade from other more "political" issues (then Foreign Minister 
Brandt outlined this distinction in a speech to African ambassadors in May 
1968),126 it is clear that West Germany's policies lend tacit, and often 
material, support to these minority governments. As Rainer Teztlaff has 
pointed out, those lofty demands of rights to self-determination, protection 
of human rights as well as the maintenance of peace have . de facto only been 
made on black Africa. Consistent violations of these principles by white 
minority regimes, on the other hand, have led to little more than meek calls 
for "peaceful change" by the Bonn government. This Teztlaff has referred to 
as "the embarrassing ambivalence of official (West German) Africa policy." 
Teztlaff explains this fact by alluding to possible lack of an "intellectual 
infra-structure" on the part of the Bonn policy establishment.127 What 
seems a more likely explanation for the ambivalence is that Bonn will support 
higher goals of international morality (if such goals in fact even exist) as 
long as the interests of its multinationals are not jeopardized by them. In 
other words, Friedenspolitik is primarily a policy designed to allow West 
German capital to exploit the Third World in peace - a peace free of revolu-
tionary wars, of demands for fair wages, of demands for a fair share of the 
global economic pie. If such "peace" requires the brutal oppression of 
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the masses then that is the price they have to pay for being on their road to 
"development." 
Such an arrangement naturally also entails helping to keep nee-colonial 
governments content vis-a-vis international capital and securely in power 
vis-a-vis the masses they supposedly represent. Friedenspolitik here again 
means support of the status quo and viewed from this perspective, "development 
aid" assumes another important function; i.e., to serve as "a concession ••• 
to enable [the imperalist power] to continue [its] exploitation of the semi-
colonial countries, "128 while tying those countries ever more closely to the 
West German economy. 
V. Conclusion 
On June 23, 1884, Bismarck argued to the Budget Committee of the 
Reichtstag: "If the German people as a whole find that its clothes are too 
tight-fitting at home, we are forced to grant protection to German initiatives 
abroad. "129 What Bismarck tried to convey was the need for the German state 
to protect the foreign ventures of its nascent industries, just as the govern-
ments of all other imperialist countries protected theirs. 
Active state intervention in the service of capital in other parts of the 
world is thus not a new German phenomenon, although it has assumed new forms 
in the present era of what Harry Magdoff has labelled "imperialism without 
colonies. "130 This paper has looked at the activities of West Germany in 
Africa from the perspective of viewing the Bonn government as an "interven-
tionist state" acting in the interests of its bourgoisie and has reached the 
following conclusions: 
(1) The African continent is enormously important to the West German econ-
omy, depite the fact that trade and investment statistics do not necessarily 
reflect this. As minerals become increasingly. "strategic" for Western econo-
mies, attention in fact will turn even more to the continent in the future. 
Africa has the following reserves of "strategic minerals" available in the 
non-socialist countries (parenthetic numbers give percentage of global re-
serves): chromium, 98 percent (96); platinum group, 97 percent (71.2); man-
ganese, 84 percent (42); tantalum, 76 percent (na); vanadium, 64 percent 
(18.7); gold, 63 percent (49.1); and cobalt, 53 percent (42).131 
Thus, Africa's importance lies not only in ready markets for West German 
products, in "safe" investment regions for its capital, but also (and this is 
increasingly so) as a supplier of raw materials vital to West Germany's econ-
omy. In fact, experts in Bonn's Economic Ministry have calculated that hun-
dreds of thousands of people in the FRG would be out of work almost instantly, 
should supplies of some of these materials be interrupted. The FRG imports 
forty-eight (48) different raw materials from Southern Africa alone, with 
chromium singled out by these West German experts as the most vulnerable of 
all mineral imports. 96 percent of all known chromium deposits in the world 
are in two Southern African countries - Zimbabwe (33 percent) and South Africa 
(63 percent).132 
(2) Bonn's official relations with African states have followed a blatant 
pattern of self-interest. 
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Before the recession of 1966/67, which proved to be the first crack in 
West Germany's Wirtschaftswunder, Bonn's foreign policy toward Africa and the 
Third World was essentially one of winning support for "free" (i.e., capital-
ist) West Germany over "communist" East Germany via the Hallstein Doctrine. 
Relations after that period have been conducted primarily with a view to 
Africa as an economic "partner." This so-called partnership policy has been 
pursued by Bonn primarily through its "development aid" program. 
The present study has agreed with those observers who have labelled this 
program as "primarily a policy to safeguard the present international system;" 
i.e., "to prevent the underdeveloped countries from leaving the capitalist 
world system and leaning toward socialist solutions. "133 One of the main 
tasks of this Entwicklungshilfe has been to assist in infrastructural develop-
ment necessary for subsequent penetration by West German capital. In addi-
tion, as has been shown, "aid" funds stay mainly in West Germany in the form 
of goods and services, benefit ting Bonn's export industry and providing jobs 
for its population. 
(3) Dealing with Africans has been a painful learning process for Bonn 
officials. Despite the fact that the West German economy demands interaction 
with the Third World in order to prevent major dislocations in production and 
sales, as well as in raw materials acquisition, Bonn's political establishment 
has dealt with the concerns of Third World peoples in rather crude and arro-
gant fashion. One example, which even shocked some good West German BUrgers, 
occurred during Marie Schlei's state visit to several African countries in the 
spring of 1977, when she confided to a reporter accompanying her that "Negroes 
are like Jews; they can smell whether or not you like them. "134 Ms. 
Schlei's position at the time: BMZ minister - the official in charge of West 
Germany's "development" policy! 
Despite the openly racist attitudes displayed by some members of the Bonn 
policy establishment, the present paper has argued that the main reasons for 
Bonn's neglect of national liberation struggles lie in the considerable eco-
nomic stakes which have traditionally tied West Germany to colonial and white 
minority regimes. This was the case in both the Portuguese colonies and 
Rhodesia, and is certainly true for relations with white South Africa. German 
cultural and racial arrogance is thus to a large extent both a creation and a 
reflection of the needs created by the demands of its imperialist interests. 
In October, 1977, another German Chancellor, representing the Western part 
of a now divided country, presented a major address to a distinguished group 
at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. In it, Helmut 
Schmidt pleaded for a spirit of cooperation among the "industrial democracies" 
to tackle the "new dimensions" of Western security - those relating to the 
economic demands for new markets, increased investments and, most importantly, 
the steady and assured supply of raw materials so vital to continued (Western) 
economic prosperity. "In practice," said the Chancellor in making his plea 
for cooperation, "nations have lost their economic autonomy."135 
As this paper has attempted to show, there is much truth in this statement 
made by Chancellor Schmidt. Economic interests are so intertwined across the 
boundaries of individual nation-states that to speak of strictly West German 
interests has become difficult, if not impossible. Does this mean that the 
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existence of this "capitalist world system" will eventually make the inter-
ventionist state obsolete? Not at all, argues Harry Magdoff: 
the nationalism of capitalist societies is the alter ego 
of the system's internationalism, Successful capitalist 
classes need the power of nation-states not only to devel-
op inner markets and to build adequate infrastructures but 
also, and equally important, to secure and protect oppor-
tunities for foreign commerce and investment in a world of 
rival nation-states,136 
Africa can thus anticipate more "aid" from West Germany as Bonn continues 
in its search for neo-colonies, 
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